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Kazakhstan’s attitude towards integration with Russia: 
less love, more fear
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine have created a new context for 
Kazakhstan’s foreign and domestic policy. The ongoing crisis in the relations with Russia and 
the West has also changed the current order in the entire post-Soviet area. From Astana’s per-
spective, the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine can be considered dangerous since it shows Rus-
sia’s determination to interfere with the domestic affairs of its neighbours in the pursuit of its 
own interests. Furthermore, this policy reveals and raises the price a country needs to pay for 
its potential attempts to break free from the Russian zone of influence. At present the biggest 
challenge for the authorities in Astana is the accelerated implementation of the idea of the Eura-
sian Union promoted by Moscow, which is to be another stage in the integration of post-Soviet 
states (presently Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus). The signing of the Eurasian Union’s founding 
documents planned for late May 2014 and the launch of this organisation (scheduled for Janu-
ary 2015) is sure to bring Kazakhstan closer to Russia and simultaneously limit its economic and 
political independence. Nevertheless, Astana’s position in relations with Moscow will to a large 
extent depend on the new shape of the relations between Russia and China. China is pursuing 
its own strategic interests in Central Asia (including in the energy sector) and its main partner 
in the region is Kazakhstan. At the domestic level, Russia’s actions in Ukraine made the autho-
rities in Astana fear that measures similar to those used in Ukraine could be applied towards 
Kazakhstan. On the one hand this has led to increased efforts aimed at consolidating the state 
and strengthening its structures, and on the other hand it has brought about a revision of those 
aspects of domestic policy which Russia could interpret as a pretext for interfering. 
Integration projects – an effective tool for 
bringing post-Soviet states closer to Russia
The Customs Union established on 1 January 
2010 by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the 
Common Economic Space (CES), in place since 
1 January 2012, have proved to be the first effec-
tively functioning economic organisations in the 
post-Soviet area. The establishment of the Eur-
asian Union on 1 January 2015 will be a further 
stage extending the economic integration be-
tween these states. Its founding documents are 
to be signed in Astana in late May 2014. From 
Russia’s perspective the above-mentioned proj-
ects are the most important tools in the econom-
ic integration of states of the former USSR and 
their growing political dependence on Russia, 
which is meant to counteract their attempted 
integration with the West and China. One con-
firmation of this is the fact that in autumn 2013 
Armenia was forced to join the Customs Union 
and the CES and to abandon its rapprochement 
with the EU. Another example is provided by the 
Kremlin’s determination to include Ukraine in 
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the integration process at that time. From the 
perspective of the Kremlin, the Eurasian Union 
is supposed to be an alternative for the Western 
model of modernisation and the shape of the 
political system and one of the major “poles” of 
the contemporary world able to influence global 
politics. Russia is the party initiating the integra-
tion processes and it has the greatest ability to 
influence the shape of the Eurasian Union.
The evolution of Kazakhstan’s position 
towards its integration with Russia: 
growing fear
Kazakhstan decided to take part in the integra-
tion processes (2008–2009) because it viewed 
them as a chance for economic development 
and a way to alleviate the consequences of the 
economic crisis. It was hoped that integration 
with Russia would help Kazakh manufacturers 
to enter the Russian market and facilitate the 
modernisation of domestic production capabil-
ities in the context of the increased competition 
in Kazakhstan itself (generated by the inflow of 
goods and services from Russia). Astana saw 
its membership of the Customs Union as a tool 
which would enable it to curb the dynamical-
ly progressing economic expansion of China. 
The positive approach towards this project un-
doubtedly also resulted from the fact that the 
author of the concept of the Eurasian Union 
was President Nursultan Nazarbayev (although 
the concept had been devised in completely 
different political circumstances): from Asta-
na’s perspective Moscow merely put his ideas 
into practice. In 1994, in part due  to its difficult 
economic and political situation, Kazakhstan 
sought out the possibilities of closer economic 
cooperation with Russia.
In time, certain economic effects of the Cus-
toms Union and the CES came to light which 
were unfavourable for Kazakhstan. There was 
an increase in the country’s trade deficit with 
Russia1 and in the prices of foodstuffs2, and 
an expansion of Russian companies onto the 
Kazakh market was observed (the number of 
Russian companies registered in Kazakhstan 
rose by 80% in 2012 against the previous year). 
Russia has also assumed a leading role in the 
main bodies of the newly established organi-
sations (e.g. in early 2013 Russians held 84% 
of posts in the Eurasian Economic Commission 
created in 2012). All this has caused a change in 
Astana’s approach to this project. Kazakhstan 
voiced its protest publicly when Russia tried to 
make the Eurasian Union a political project and 
proposed the creation of a parliament of all 
member states; this plan was revealed in 20123. 
From that moment on Kazakhstan started to 
openly criticise attempts to provide integration 
projects with a political dimension and sug-
gested that they pose a threat to the country’s 
political sovereignty4. Criticism of the econom-
ic dimension of the cooperation also began to 
be voiced ever more frequently. It concerned 
mainly Russia’s initiatives aimed at creating 
non-tariff barriers for Kazakh companies on the 
1 Since the creation of the Customs Union, the trade defi-
cit between Kazakhstan and Russia has gradually in-
creased reaching US$ 5.3 billion in 2009, US$ 6.5 billion 
in 2010, US$ 8.5 billion in 2011 and US$ 10.4 billion in 
2012 (Kazakhstan’s Statistical Office).
2 The increase in the prices of foodstuffs was 10% in 
2010 and 9% in 2011 compared with 3% in 2009 (after: 
Kazakhstan’s Statistical Office).
3 In February 2012 at the summit of the CIS parliamenta-
ry assemblies, Sergey Naryshkin, Chairman of the State 
Duma, proposed the creation of a parliament of the Eur-
asian Union; the idea was rejected by Kazakhstan and Be-
larus who feared that the creation of supranational bod-
ies would limit the competence of national institutions.
4 E.g. the interview with Erlan Karin, secretary of the 
presidential party NurOtan in the newspaper Vremya, 
entitled “Do not dream” (19 September 2012), published 
ahead of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana.
In time, certain economic effects of the 
Customs Union and the CES came to light 
which were unfavourable for Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan voiced its protest publicly 
when Russia tried to make the Eurasian 
Union a political project.
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Russian market. This illustrates Russia’s selective 
implementation of the integration rules. On the 
other hand, criticism also concerned the lack of 
possibility to defend domestic entrepreneurs 
against competition from the Russian compa-
nies entering the Kazakh market. 
The Customs Union and the CES have proved to 
be rather efficient re-integration organisations 
favourable mainly to Russia. Even the positive 
results of the Customs Union, e.g. the increase 
in the number of cars manufactured in Kazakh-
stan, are not necessarily the effect of the mar-
ket opening up, but rather seem to result from 
the limiting of import possibilities and are more 
favourable to the expansion of Russian produc-
ers onto the Kazakh market than the spread of 
Kazakh companies onto the Russian market5. 
Moreover, after the Kremlin’s disclosure of the 
political aspect of the Eurasian project it be-
gan to be perceived in Astana as a threat to 
Kazakhstan’s national sovereignty6. Kazakhstan 
was still aware that it would be impossible to 
abandon the integration process due to the 
country’s dependence on Russia in the areas 
of economy and security, and due to there be-
ing no attractive alternative to Kazakhstan’s 
relations with Moscow. China cannot be seen 
as such an alternative because of anti-Chinese 
5 According to data compiled by Kazakhstan’s leading car 
manufacturer Asia Avto (83% of the market share), since 
the creation of the Customs Union the production of 
cars has at least doubled year on year, cf. http://www.
aziaavto.kz/news/2014/30_01.htm. In spite of this, due 
to the poorly developed Kazakh domestic production, it 
was mainly Russian manufacturers who benefited from 
the opening of markets – the Customs Union has led 
to an increase in import duties and at the same time 
opened up the Kazakh market to Russia with no limita-
tions. In consequence, according to data for Q1 2014 the 
sale of cars manufactured in Kazakhstan rose by 25% 
year on year, and the sale of Russian cars by 41% year on 
year (data after the Association of Kazakh Automotive 
Business AKAB). It is also worth noting that the Russian 
Avtovaz has a 50% market share in the Kazakh car man-
ufacturer Asia Avto.
6 One demonstration of this was Nazarbayev’s repeated 
declarations that the Eurasian Union is a political rather 
than an economic project and poses no threat to Ka-
zakhstan’s sovereignty, cf. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2013-01-23/kazakhstan-distanc-
es-itself-moscows-integration-projects
sentiments deeply rooted in Kazakh society and 
elites, considerably greater than anti-Russian 
sentiments. Kazakhstan has made attempts to 
slow down and diffuse the integration process 
on the one hand, and to increase the dynamic 
of how it is being shaped on the other. 
Simultaneously with the developments in 
Ukraine, Astana’s actions have gradually be-
come focused on minimising the losses con-
nected with Kazakhstan’s participation in the 
integration process. It seems that until March 
2014 Kazakhstan had been hoping for a re-
duction of the level of integration by limiting 
the scope of the founding documents to in-
stitutional aspects of the Eurasian Union then 
in progress. This expectation was voiced by 
Nazarbayev during the summit in Moscow on 
5 March 2014. In practice this would mean the 
creation of a mock organisation which would 
have no real influence on the shaping of the 
economic policy of its member states. 
The events in Ukraine (especially since Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea) have demonstrated the 
dire consequences of choosing any option oth-
er than that of integration with the Russian 
Federation, and this has influenced the prog-
ress of negotiations on the creation of the Eur-
asian Union. The Russian offensive in Ukraine 
has clearly weakened the position of Kazakh-
stan (and Belarus), encouraging Russia to not 
only make preparations for the signing of the 
framework political agreement (as initially ex-
pected), but also to open negotiations on its 
individual regulatory provisions concerning co-
operation in specific sectors of the economy. 
Simultaneously with the developments in 
Ukraine, Astana’s actions have gradually 
become focused on minimising the losses 
connected with Kazakhstan’s participation 
in the integration process.
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The adoption of such provisions would limit the 
possibility of member states to conduct an in-
dependent economic policy. The revealed draft 
of the Eurasian Union’s founding document in-
dicates that to a large extent it also concerns 
such sensitive issues as security (including 
preferences for the Customs Union states in 
armaments tender procedures) and limits the 
capability of domestic industry to defend itself 
against competition from the Russian compa-
nies (e.g. it limits the possibility to subsidise the 
domestic business sector). 
In spite of the limited room for manoeuvre, 
Kazakhstan is trying to defend itself against 
Russia’s plans by playing a more active role in 
the project and by promoting solutions based 
on partner cooperation7. The unwillingness to 
strengthen Russia’s position in the Eurasian 
Union is another cause of Astana’s negative ap-
proach towards the possible expansion of the 
project to include Armenia – Kazakhstan fears 
that its voice would be somewhat drowned out 
and that Armenia would support Moscow’s 
stance (this issue is not so clear in the case of 
Kyrgyzstan which may support Astana). 
In this context it seems that the signing of the 
Eurasian Union’s founding documents in May 
2014 will certainly limit Kazakhstan’s economic 
and political independence and might lead to 
Russia’s cultural domination8. The current nego-
tiations concerning the shape of the agreement 
will result only in the definition of the complexi-
ty of the new multiple ties between Kazakhstan 
and Russia. Both the shape of the final agree-
ments and the method used to implement them 
will be tests for the Kazakh strategy.
7 Lecture by Nursultan Nazarbayev at the Moscow State 
University on 28 April 2014.
8 During this lecture (op. cit.) Nazarbayev said that “it is 
important for the cultural and humanitarian integration 
process not to blur the spiritual and cultural diversity of 
the Eurasian space by allowing one aspect to dominate 
others”. In this lecture Nazarbayev proposed that the 
Eurasian Union institutions use the languages of all of 
the member states and that their seat be in Astana (“in 
the very heart of Eurasia”). 
Kazakhstan’s domestic policy 
and the Ukrainian Maidan
Taken together, the crisis in Ukraine and the cri-
sis in the relations between Russia and the West 
have been the most important factor to influence 
Kazakhstan’s domestic policy. For more than two 
decades of its independence Kazakhstan has built 
a state which is well-managed but still far from 
meeting democratic standards. The Ukrainian 
Maidan has reinforced the authorities in Asta-
na in their positive view of the recent internal 
reforms aimed at effectively securing Kazakh-
stan against its own possible Ukrainian scenario. 
The bloody clashes in Zhanaozen9 in December 
2011 contributed to an acceleration of the in-
ternal reforms conducted in response to ideo-
logical changes taking place in Kazakhstan and 
the growing social tensions. The actions carried 
out by the authorities failed to democratise the 
country and focused on improving the system 
of government and control over the regions 
(the establishment of the Ministry of Regional 
Development), increasing the efficiency of the 
administration structures (the creation of a civil 
service, the informal recommendation to em-
ploy graduates of the international scholarship 
Bolashak programmes on deputy managerial 
posts10), creating mechanisms for the allevi-
ation of social tensions (local elections at the 
9 The authorities bloodily suppressed  a strike which pe-
troleum sector workers had been organising for several 
months. According to official data 14 people were killed. 
10 Until 2013 nearly 10,000 Kazakhs benefited from the 
state-funded Bolashak programme, with two thirds of 
them completing their education in the USA or the Unit-
ed Kingdom. 
The Ukrainian Maidan has reinforced the 
authorities in Astana in their positive view of 
the recent internal reforms aimed at effec-
tively securing Kazakhstan against its own 
possible Ukrainian scenario.
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lowest level of territorial administration, pro-
moting the role of tri-party commissions in la-
bour disputes, numerous social programmes). 
The state ideology shaped by the authorities has 
also been corrected to include more references 
to Kazakhstan’s cohesion and independence. The 
authorities’ aim is to consolidate the civil service 
system and to centre society around the state 
(this is best illustrated by the new concept of the 
“patriot act” announced in the annual presiden-
tial address to the nation in 2014). At the same 
time the space used for presenting the slogans of 
the Kazakh nationalism has been widened, and 
the authorities have adopted solutions in their 
decision making process in line with the expec-
tations of these circles, e.g. president Nazarba-
yev’s decision of 2013 to change the alphabet 
from Cyrillic to Latin within 15 years11. 
Crimea as a warning for the CIS
The escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, i.e. Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent 
sabotage actions in eastern Ukraine, have clear-
ly demonstrated Russia’s determination to pur-
sue its own interests in the area of influence 
it had delineated. The Kremlin has challenged 
the rules of the game observed so far, including 
the permanence of the borders (set and guar-
11 The activity of nationalist groups was tolerated because 
they could be used as an argument in the process of 
shaping the Eurasian Union (in 2012, the senator and 
chairman of the Party of Patriots, Gani Kasymov, who 
headed the Kazakh delegation criticised the idea of creat-
ing a common Eurasian Union parliament in his talks with 
representatives of the parliaments of Russia and Belarus).
anteed by Moscow) of the second most import-
ant – after Russia – state of the former USSR. 
This came as a shock to the entire CIS and made 
Astana fear that Russia might make use of the 
arguments it had used to justify its actions to-
ward Ukraine in relation to Kazakhstan. These 
arguments include: the necessity to defend 
the Russian-speaking population, the alleged 
dysfunctionality of the state, the emergence 
of “Fascist forces”, and the questioning of the 
legitimacy of the borders and the toppling of 
legitimate authorities by external forces.
In Kazakhstan particular fears have been 
sparked by the voices of certain Russian poli-
ticians suggesting the possibility of the inclu-
sion of northern Kazakhstan or the entire Cen-
tral Asia into Russia (this was mentioned e.g. 
by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Vice Chairman of the 
State Duma) or the theoretical possibility of 
challenging the independence and legitimacy 
of Kazakhstan’s borders in general12. 
An important potential problem is the Russian 
minority (24% of the country’s population, with 
other Slavic minorities account for ca. 3% of the 
population) living mainly in the northern part of 
Kazakhstan. These people feel increasing pres-
sure resulting from the growing importance of 
the Kazakh language. Similar pressure has also 
been caused by the informal policy of Kazakh-
isation and the growing nationalist tendencies 
in Kazakhstan, demonstrated by the increased 
activity of nationalists and in their critical ap-
proach towards Russia and the Eurasian Union.
Fears concerning the Kremlin’s intentions have 
led to a correction of Kazakhstan’s domestic 
policy. On the one hand, there has been an in-
crease in the authorities’ actions aimed at con-
tinuing the internal reforms to consolidate the 
12 There is a dangerous analogy to the situation in Crimea. 
This was granted to Ukraine by Russia in 1954 and until 
1936 Kazakhstan had been an autonomous part of the 
Russian FSSR, and when it was raised to the status of 
a union republic it left its then capital Orenburg in the 
Russian FSSR. After the annexation of Crimea, Nazarbayev 
has frequently made reference to the fact that Kazakh-
stan and Russia have totally regulated their border issues. 
The entire CIS was shocked by how the 
Kremlin has challenged the rules of the 
game observed so far and Astana fears 
that the arguments which Russia had 
made use of in its actions against Ukraine 
could be turned against Kazakhstan. 
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state and increase the level of control over both 
state structures and society. These actions have 
included the reform of the power structures 
(the establishment of the National Guard and 
the State Protection Service) and certain legis-
lative amendments increasing the scope of con-
trol over the Internet and harsher penalties for 
separatism. The aim the authorities have is to 
demonstrate that Kazakhstan – unlike Ukraine 
– is a well-functioning state with effective tools 
which can be used to control the internal situa-
tion (this is supposed to discredit Russia’s argu-
ment that the state is dysfunctional). 
There has also been a change in the approach 
towards nationalist-oriented groups whose ide-
ology might be used by Russia as a pretext for 
an open intervention in Kazakhstan’s domestic 
affairs13. Astana will be trying to limit the activ-
ity of nationalists in order to avoid accusations 
of tolerating the equivalent of the Ukrainian 
Right Sector on its territory (this is portrayed as 
a Fascist organisation in Russian propaganda).
Finally, the rhetoric concerning ethnic minorities 
and the state itself has changed. This is confirmed 
by the numerous declarations made by President 
Nazarbayev stressing the multi-ethnic nature of 
the country and the rule of non-discrimination 
on grounds of ethnic or religious background14. 
The unexpected announcement of 2015 as the 
Year of People’s Assembly of Kazakhstan is an-
other presidential initiative addressed to ethnic 
minorities and a demonstration of the lack of 
ethnic problems within the state. 
13 The presentation in the Russian media of the April edi-
tion of the Anyz Adam magazine as a publication which 
promotes Fascism and the protest expressed by the Rus-
sian embassy were a good example of this. As a matter 
of fact the magazine warned its readers against Russia’s 
expansionist policy and listed similarities between Adolf 
Hitler and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. In response 
the Kazakh authorities launched an investigation into 
the content of that edition of the paper, but decided not 
to close down the magazine. 
14 On 2 April 2014 Nazarbayev alerted the “excessively 
zealous public servants” to the possible cases of dis-
crimination on grounds of language and authorised the 
prosecutor’s office to investigate them. http://en.ten-
grinews.kz/politics_sub/President-Nazarbayev-on-lan-
guages-in-Kazakhstan-252652/  
The survival strategy
Kazakhstan’s room for political manoeuvre be-
came greatly limited as the events in Ukraine 
developed. The main aim of all the activities 
carried out by Astana has been to guarantee 
that the country endures the current crisis in the 
relations between Russia and the West and the 
Russian pressure connected with the formation 
of the Eurasian Union with minimum losses. It 
was this intention to move out of reach of Russia 
that was behind the evolution of Kazakhstan’s 
approach to Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine 
– from the initially neutral approach, through 
support for the actions in Crimea, back to a pol-
icy of positive neutrality (Kazakhstan supported 
e.g. the result of the talks in Geneva). The in-
tention to avoid exposing the country to Rus-
sia’s potential actions has been the cause of the 
change in the internal rhetoric as well. What is 
important, however, is that the fear of Russia 
has also alerted the authorities and encouraged 
them to carry out actions aimed at consolidat-
ing the state and its citizens and to continue 
implementing reforms. 
Currently the most significant task faced by Ka-
zakhstan is to minimise the losses connected with 
the creation of the Eurasian Union. The return to 
office of Prime Minister of Karim Masimov, con-
sidered the most efficient of all Kazakh prime 
ministers so far, has contributed to a strength-
ening of Kazakhstan’s position. This means that 
although Astana is aware of the inevitability of 
falling into Russia’s zone of influence, it is mo-
The main aim of all the activities carried 
out by Astana is to guarantee that the 
country endures the current crisis in re-
lations between Russia and the West and 
the Russian pressure connected with the 
formation of the Eurasian Union with min-
imum losses.
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bilising its resources to reduce the negative con-
sequences of the rapprochement with Russia.
The events in Ukraine have shed a different 
light on the problem of the unavoidable suc-
cession of Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kazakhstan’s 
political evolution has strengthened the posi-
tion of president Nazarbayev making him the 
unquestioned author of the state’s policy and 
the guarantor of the current state and politi-
cal system and of the social order (at least in 
the opinion of general public). This means that 
his departure from office might spark internal 
problems which in current conditions could 
serve as a pretext for Russia to become involved 
in Kazakhstan’s internal affairs. This is the mo-
tivation behind Nazarbayev’s efforts in the last 
two years to improve the party and adminis-
tration apparatus and to consolidate the elite 
centred around the president. The Ukrainian 
context has highlighted the weaknesses of the 
authoritarian system in Kazakhstan and made 
it necessary to correct it and it seems that this 
may serve as a catalyst to the preparations for 
succession (the recent change of government 
on 2 April 2014 has not impinged on the bal-
ance within the elite, though it has strength-
ened the position of the president’s daughter 
Dariga Nazarbayeva). 
In the external dimension the Ukrainian crisis 
has acted as an impulse for increased activity 
from Kazakhstan in the international arena and 
also in the CIS area (in particular in relations 
with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan). The main aim 
the authorities in Astana have is to present 
Kazakhstan as a constructive partner which is 
open for cooperation with all parties in spite of 
its strategic relations with Russia. Its attempts 
to involve itself in solving the Ukrainian crisis 
as a mediator (by holding talks with US Presi-
dent Barack Obama and Germany’s Chancellor 
Angela Merkel) were a debacle, but they were 
nonetheless used by Astana to demonstrate 
that it has no wish to be seen as a passive ally 
of Russia (Kazakhstan abstained from voting 
on the UN resolution on Crimea, unlike Belarus 
which supported Russia’s stance). 
It seems that the ineffectiveness of the West’s 
actions towards Russia in the Ukrainian crisis 
has inspired Kazakhstan to hope for support 
from China. This is suggested by the active 
preparations for Nazarbayev’s visit to China in 
May 2014. It is probable that Astana sees the 
development of economic cooperation with 
China as potential counterweight to the grow-
ing influence of Russia or that it hopes that Chi-
na will support it in its relations with Moscow, 
with China’s motivation being the desire to de-
fend its own interests in the region.
Prospects
Kazakhstan has been at the centre of the Rus-
sian-led reintegration process which is of key im-
portance for the CIS area. After the creation of 
the Eurasian Union the principles of cooperation 
between Russia and Kazakhstan (and also those 
between Russia and China), observed so far, will 
change. The key factor in arranging these rela-
tions will be the final version of the agreement 
on the Eurasian Union, followed by the process 
of its implementation. This will be influenced by 
the stance of the third member of the newly cre-
ated organisation, i.e. Belarus. Irrespective of the 
content of the agreements, the fact of them be-
ing signed alone will be a success for Russia and 
will increase Russia’s ability to influence the situ-
ation in Kazakhstan. At the same time, however, 
the Eurasian Union motivates the authorities to 
continue the internal consolidation and Kazakh-
stan will remain a stable country for at least as 
long as it is ruled by Nazarbayev. 
The prospect of the Eurasian Union moti-
vates the authorities to continue the inter-
nal consolidation and Kazakhstan will re-
main a stable country for at least as long 
as it is ruled by Nazarbayev. 
8OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 137
EDITORS: Olaf Osica, Krzysztof Strachota  
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska 
TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz   
CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
The question of setting the Russian-Chinese 
relations in the context of Russia’s deteriorat-
ing relations with the West will be another im-
portant factor influencing the situation in Ka-
zakhstan. It seems that the significance and the 
role of China in the Kremlin’s policy is growing 
and this may encourage Russia to take China’s 
strategic interests in Central Asia into consid-
eration, which may in turn prove favourable to 
Kazakhstan. From Kazakhstan’s perspective, 
presently China – not the West – is the only 
actor able to counterbalance Russia in Central 
Asia and at the same time give Astana enough 
room for manoeuvre in its relations with the 
Kremlin. Relations between Russia and China 
will be reflected in the future and the nature 
of the intersections (be they of synergy or com-
petition) between the Chinese concept of the 
transport corridor named the New Silk Route 
and the Eurasian Union, with Kazakhstan as 
a key element of both projects. 
Kazakh-Russian relations will also be influenced 
by the degree of the Kremlin’s involvement in 
the Ukrainian crisis and the necessity to reas-
sess the sequence of priorities in Russia’s policy. 
It cannot be ruled out that Russia’s increased ac-
tivity on its western borders will lead to it being 
less involved in the processes underway in Cen-
tral Asia. On the other hand, Russia’s willingness 
to demonstrate its political power might encour-
age it to be more active in the region. This, how-
ever, seems the less probable scenario.
